Explaining Israeli Intelligence Deficiency to Prevent 7 October Hamas Attack

Abstract

The Hamas attack of October 7 was a pretext for the Israeli retaliation that was a deliberate move to wipe out the Palestinian population of Gaza. The retaliation has ended in considerable territorial gains not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria. Observation of Israeli reconnaissance failure and the succeeding Hamas attack invites an abductive form of explanatory reasoning. A candidate hypothesis is Israeli over confidence about their intelligence services leading to their evaluation of the impossibility of such an attack. Yet, it is established that Israeli intelligence services were informed of Hamas attack preparations. Hence, Hamas attack preparations and no prompt Israeli reaction is to be explained. The explanation is that Israeli government willingly let Hamas attack the kibbutzim. The assumption of rationality does not explain Israeli inactivity during Hamas attack and Hamas preparations to attack. The assumption explains Israeli inactivity only by letting Hamas attack first and then retaliate to conquer the territory of Gaza first and later other territories Israeli government evaluates as strategic regions and locations. What are the global implications of Israeli retaliation? The central implication is that if Ukraine-Russia war ends by some way or another, then Trump can pay more attention on the Middle East and China. Hence, any end of the Ukraine-Russia war would prompt the U.S. to earmark more resources in supporting Israel fueling conflict further in the Middle East and animosity level in U.S.-China relations. Therefore, whether the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine would benefit global security remains as a question mark.